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We present a simple and practical protocol for the solution of a secure multiparty communication
task, the secret sharing, and its experimental realization. In this protocol, a secret message is split
among several parties in a way that its reconstruction require the collaboration of the participating
parties. In the proposed scheme the parties solve the problem by a sequential communication of a
single qubit. Moreover we show that our scheme is equivalent to the use of a multiparty entangled
GHZ state but easier to realize and better scalable in practical applications.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a.
Splitting a secret message in way that a single per-
son is not able to reconstruct it is a common task in
information processing and especially high security ap-
plications. Suppose e.g. that the launch sequence of a
nuclear missile is protected by a secret code, and it should
be ensured that not a single lunatic is able to activate it
but at least two lunatics. A solution for this problem
and its generalization including several variations is pro-
vided by classical cryptography [1] and is called secret
sharing. It consists of a way of splitting the message
using mathematical algorithms and the distribution of
the resulting pieces to two or more legitimate users by
classical communication. However all ways of classical
communication currently used are susceptible to eaves-
dropping attacks. As the usage of quantum resources
can lead to unconditionally secure communication (e.g.
[2, 3]), a protocol introducing quantum cryptography to
secret sharing was proposed [4, 5, 6, 7]. In this protocol
a shared GHZ-state allows the information splitting and
the eavesdropper protection simultaneously. But, due
to lack of efficient multi-photon sources an experimental
demonstration of secret sharing is still missing. Till now
solely the principle feasibility of an experimental realiza-
tion using pseudo-GHZ states was shown [8].
Here we propose a protocol for (N + 1) parties in
which only sequential single qubit communication be-
tween them is used and show its equivalence to the GHZ-
protocol. As our protocol requires only single qubits it
is realizable with the current state-of-the-art technolo-
gies and above all much more scalable with respect to
the number of participating parties. These gains enabled
the experimental demonstration of our protocol for six
parties. To our knowledge this is the first experimental
implementation of a full protocol for secret sharing and
by far the highest ever reported number of participants
in any quantum information processing task.
Let us first shortly describe the entanglement based
protocol using a GHZ state for secret sharing. Consider
(N + 1) persons, each having a particle from the maxi-
mally entangled (N + 1) particle GHZ-state
|GHZ 〉 = 1√
2
|00 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N+1
〉+ |11 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N+1
〉
 . (1)
One of the parties, let’s call him distributor, wants to dis-
tribute a secret message among the remaining N persons
(recipients) in a way that all of them have to cooperate in
order to reconstruct the distributed message. To achieve
this task each participant performs a projection mea-
surement of his particle onto the eigenstates |kj , φj 〉 =
1/
√
2(|0 〉 + kj exp(iφj)|1 〉) (j = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1) of the
operator
σ̂j(φj) =
∑
kj
kj |kj , φj 〉〈 kj , φj |, (2)
where kj = ±1 denotes the local result in mode j for a
preselected parameter φj . The partners randomly and
independently choose between φj = 0 or pi/2. The corre-
lation function for a (N+1) particles GHZ state is defined
as the expectation value of the product of (N + 1) local
results and is therefore given by
E(φj) = 〈
N+1∏
j
σ̂j(φj)〉 = cos
N+1∑
j
φj
 . (3)
After the measurement each recipient publicly an-
nounces her/his choice of φj , but keeps the result kj
secret. By doing so the distributor can decide when
this procedure leads to perfect (anti-)correlated results,
i.e. when | cos(∑Nj φj)| = 1, which happens in half of
the runs. In these instances each of the recipients is
able to infer the distributor’s measurement result kd if
and only if he/she knows the measurement results kr
(r = 1, 2, . . . , N) of all the other recipients. Consequently
2FIG. 1: Scheme for (N +1) party single qubit secret sharing.
The distributor prepares a qubit in an initial state and acts
on it with the phase operator σ̂(ϕd). Afterwards the qubit is
sequentially communicated from one recipient to another each
acting on it with σ̂(ϕj) as well. The last recipient performs
finally a measurement of the qubit leading to the result ±1. In
half of the cases the phases add up such that the preparation
and the measurement are perfectly (anti-)correlated.
the cooperation of all the recipients is required and any
subset of the parties has no information on the secret.
For a security proof of this scheme against eavesdropping
attacks see [5, 9].
An equivalent (N +1) party scheme (see fig. 2) for the
same task where only the sequential communication of a
single qubit is used, runs as follows.
The distributor randomly prepares a qubit in one of the
four states |±x 〉, |±y 〉 of two mutually unbiased bases x
and y with
|±x 〉 = 1√
2
(|0 〉 ± |1 〉) (4)
|±y 〉 = 1√
2
(|0 〉 ± i|1 〉). (5)
Note that all these states are of the form
|χ 〉i =
1√
2
(|0 〉+ eiϕd |1 〉) , (6)
where ϕd is chosen to have one out of the four values
{0, pi, pi/2, 3pi/2}. During the protocol the qubit is then
sequentially communicated from recipient to recipient
each acting on it with the unitary phase operator
σ̂j(ϕj) =
{
|0 〉 → |0 〉
|1 〉 → eiϕj |1 〉, (7)
where ϕj ∈ {0, pi, pi/2, 3pi/2} as well. Therefore having
passed all parties the qubit will end up in the state
|χ 〉f =
1√
2
(
|0 〉+ ei(ϕd+
∑
j ϕj)|1 〉
)
. (8)
After this communication stage each participant divides
his action for every run into two classes: a class X cor-
responding to the choice of ϕj ∈ {0, pi} and a class Y
corresponding to ϕj ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2}. Following this clas-
sification they inform the distributor about the class-
affiliation of their action for each run. Note that they
keep the particular value of ϕj secret. This corresponds
to the announcement of φj while keeping kr secret in
the GHZ-scheme. The order in which the recipients Rj
announce the class-affiliation is randomly determined by
the distributor. The last recipient RN finally measures
the received qubit in the x basis. Therefore for her/him
it suffices to choose only between ϕN = 0 or ϕN = pi/2
and keep the outcome kN of the measurement secret [10].
The probability that RN detects the state |+x 〉 is given
by
p+(ϕd, ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) =
1
2
(1 + cos(ϕd +
N∑
j
ϕj)), (9)
whereas the probability to detect the state |−x 〉 is
p−(ϕd, ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) =
1
2
(1− cos(ϕd +
N∑
j
ϕj)). (10)
So the expectation value of the measurement result is
A(ϕd, ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) = p+(ϕd, ϕ1, . . . , ϕN )
− p−(ϕd, ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) = cos(ϕd +
N∑
j
ϕj). (11)
From the broadcasted class-affiliations of all intro-
duced phase shifts ϕj the distributor is able to decide
which runs lead to perfect (anti-)correlations, means
when | cos(ϕd +
∑N
j ϕj)| = 1, what happens in half of
the runs. We call this a valid run of the protocol. In
these cases each of the recipients is able to infer the dis-
tributor’s choice of ϕd if and only if he/she knows the
choice of ϕj of the other recipients. Consequently the
collaboration of all recipients is necessary.
By associating the particular value of ϕd with ”0” and
”1”, say e.g. ϕd ∈ {0, pi/2} =̂ 0 and ϕd ∈ {pi, 3pi/2} =̂ 1,
the parties are able to secretly share a common bit string
(key). This is possible as obviously the required correla-
tions based on local manipulation of relative phases can
equivalently be established by communicating a single
qubit instead of employing many entangled qubits of a
GHZ-type state; (compare equation 3 and 11).
In order to ensure the security of the protocol against
eavesdropping or cheating [11] the distributor arbitrarily
selects a certain number (might depend on the degree of
security requirements) of particular valid runs. For this
subset the correlations are publicly compared, again in a
random order of the recipients. The public comparison
will reveal any eavesdropping or cheating strategy. That
can be easily seen from the following intercept/resend
eavesdropping attacks.
Imagine for instance the first recipient R1 tries to
infer the secret without the help or the authorization
3of the remaining participants by measuring the qubit
sent by the distributor before acting on it with σ̂1(ϕ1)
and afterwards sending it ahead to the second recipi-
ent R2. For convenience, let us assume R1 chooses for
this measurement one of the two protocol bases x or
y. As the distributor applies randomly one of four dif-
ferent phase shifts, the probability that the state |χ 〉i
is an eigenstate of the measurement chosen by R1 is
1/2. In the other half of the cases the measurement re-
sult of R1 will be completely random as it holds that
|〈±y | ±x 〉| = |〈±x | ±y 〉| = 1/2. This means that re-
cipient R1 gets no information about the distributor’s
choice of ϕd. Furthermore this cheating will cause an
overall error of 25 % in the correlations. That’s because
if R1 has chosen the wrong basis, the final state of the
qubit after all (N + 1) introduced phase shifts will be of
the form
|χ 〉f ′ =
1√
2
(
|0 〉+ ei
∑N
j=1
ϕj |1 〉
)
(12)
instead of |χ 〉f .
The state |χ 〉f ′ will, measured by the last recipient
RN , give with probability 1/2 a result which is not com-
patible to the expected correlations. The same situa-
tion an eavesdropper is faced with, when applying such
a strategy. The usage of the bases x and y for an inter-
cept/resend attack is already the optimal one concerning
the information gain on the valid runs. One might only
consider using the intermediate (or so called Breidbart)
basis |±b 〉 1√
2+
√
2
(|±x 〉 + |±y 〉) = 1√
2
(|0 〉 ± eipi/4|1 〉)
which gives the eavesdropper maximum information on
all exchanged bits [12]. But even here the error rate goes
necessarily up to 25 %. The security of the presented pro-
tocol against a general eavesdropping attack follows from
the proven security (see for detail [2]) of the well known
BB84 protocol [13]. Each communication step between
two successive parties can be regarded as a BB84 proto-
col using the bases x and y. Any set of dishonest parties
in our scheme can be viewed as an eavesdropper in BB84
protocol.
The presented protocol was experimentally imple-
mented for six (5+1) parties, thus clearly showing the
practicality and user-friendliness of the scheme.
We encoded the qubit of the protocol in a single pho-
ton where the basis states |0 〉 and |1 〉 are represented
by the polarization states of the photon |H 〉 and |V 〉 re-
spectively, corresponding to horizontal (H) and vertical
(V) linear polarization. The single photons were pro-
vided by a heralded single photon source. The setup
is shown in Fig. 2. A pair of photons is created via a
spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) pro-
cess. As the photons of a pair are strongly correlated
in time the detection of one photon in DT heralds the
existence of the other one which is used for the proto-
col. Thus from a coincidence detection between DT and
D+/D− within a chosen time window of 4 ns we assume
the communication of a single photon only. For this co-
incidence time window and singlecount rates of about
FIG. 2: Setup for single qubit secret sharing. Pairs of orthog-
onally polarized photons are generated via a type II SPDC
process in a BBO crystal. The detection of one photon from
the pair by DT heralds the existence of the other one used for
the performance of the protocol. The initial polarization state
is prepared by the distributor by a polarizer in front of the
trigger detector and a half- and quarter wave plate (HWP1,
QWP). Each of the recipients (R1 . . . R5) introduces one out
of four phase shifts according to a number from a pseudo
random number generator (RNG) by the rotation of YVO4
crystals (C1 . . .C5). The last party analyzes additionally the
resulting polarization state of the photon with a half-wave
plate (HWP2) and a polarizing beam splitter.
70000 s−1 in D+/D− accidental coincidences were negli-
gible. The SPDC process was run by pumping a 2 mm
long β-barium borate (BBO) crystal with a blue single
mode laser diode (402.5 nm) at an optical output power
of 10 mW. Type-II phase matching was used at the de-
generate case leading to pairs of orthogonally polarized
photons at a wavelength of λ = 805 nm (∆λ ≈ 6 nm).
In order to prepare the initial polarization state a po-
larizer transmitting vertically polarized photons was put
in front of the trigger detector DT ensuring that only hor-
izontally polarized photons can lead to a coincidence de-
tection. The distributor was equipped with a motorized
half-wave plate (HWP1) followed by quarter-wave plate
(QWP) at an angle of 45 ◦. By rotation of HWP1 to the
angles 0 ◦, 45 ◦ and 22.5 ◦,−22.5 ◦ he could transform the
horizontally polarized photons coming from the source to
|±y 〉 and |±x 〉. This corresponds to applying the phase-
shifts ϕd ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2} and ϕd ∈ {0, pi} respectively. As
the phase-shifts of the recipients had to be applied inde-
pendently from the incoming polarization state the usage
of standard wave plates was not possible. Therefore the
unitary phase operator was implemented using birefrin-
gent uniaxial 200 µm thick Yttrium Vanadate (YVO4)
crystals (Ci). The crystals were cut such that their optic
axis lies parallel to the surface and aligned that H and
V polarization states correspond to their normal modes.
Therefore by rotating the crystals along the optic axis
for a certain angle a specific relative phase shift was ap-
plied independent from the incoming polarization state.
An additional YVO4 crystal (Ccomp, 1000 µm thick) was
used to compensate for dispersion effects. The last party
performed the projection measurement using a half-wave
plate (HWP2) at an angle of 22.5
◦ followed by polariz-
ing beam-splitter (PBS). The photons were detected at
D+/D− and DT by passively quenched silicon avalanche
4ztotal zone zraw zval QBER [%]
|±x 〉 27501 9814 883 452 25.22 ± 2.04
|±y 〉 24993 9188 784 409 30.32 ± 2.27
|±b 〉 38174 13706 1137 588 30.27 ± 1.89
TABLE I: Results of the simulation of an intercept/resend
eavesdropping strategy in the protocol- and intermediate ba-
sis. The attack was done by inserting a polarizer between the
distributor and the first recipient. In each case the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) rises up to more than 25 % and by this
blows the eavesdropper’s cover.
photo diodes (Si-APD) with an efficiency of about 35 %.
The protocol was repeated ztotal = 25000 times. One
run consisted of rotating the crystals and opening the
detectors for a collection time window τ = 200µs what
took together about 1 s. Each crystal was thereby driven
by a motor to one of four different positions given by a
pseudo random number. This means the application of
one of the four phase shifts at random by each party.
Out of ztotal only zone = 9125 times exactly one photon
was detected at DT within τ due to poissonian photon-
counting statistics. In these runs a coincidence detection
happened zraw = 2107 times which provided us with the
raw key. From this we extracted zval = 982 valid runs
where | cos(∑Nj ϕj)| = 1 (506 times cos(∑Nj ϕj) = 1 and
476 times cos(
∑N
j ϕj) = −1 ) with a quantum bit error
rate (QBER) of 2.34± 0.48 %.
In order to show that the QBER increases signifi-
cantly by an eavesdropping attack we simulated an in-
tercept/resend strategy by inserting a polarizer between
the distributor and the first recipient. The attack was
done in the protocol bases |±x 〉, |±y 〉 as well as in the
intermediate basis |±b 〉. For the latter two the polarizer
was additionally sandwiched by two quarter-wave plates.
The angular settings (1st QWP, polarizer, 2nd QWP)
were {45 ◦, 0 ◦,−45 ◦} and {−45 ◦, 22.5 ◦, 45 ◦}. For every
choice of the basis the QBER went up to at least 25 %
(or even higher due to other experimental imperfections).
The results are summarized in Table I.
In summary, we introduced a new scheme for solving
the multi-party communication task of secret sharing.
Unlike other schemes employing multi-particle entangled
states our protocol uses only the sequential communica-
tion of a single qubit. As single qubit operations using
linear optical elements and the analysis of photon polar-
ization states are quite well accomplishable with present
day technology, we were therefore able to present a first
experimental demonstration of the protocol for six par-
ties. This is to our knowledge the highest number of
actively performing parties in a quantum protocol ever
implemented so far, and the first ever experimental im-
plementation of a full quantum secret sharing protocol.
We also simulated an eavesdropping intercept/resend at-
tack and by this showed the resistance of the protocol
against such kind of strategies because of a significantly
increasing error rate. In principle we see no experimen-
tal barrier to extend the performed protocol to even sig-
nificantly higher number of participants. The achieved
key exchange rate could be easily increased by using fast
electro-optical phase modulators. Also the use of weak
coherent pulses of light containing much less than one
photon on average, instead of a heralded single photon
source, is possible and might further reduce the experi-
mental effort. However, this would be at the expense of
the concept of communicating strictly one qubit and can
be also disadvantageous for the practical performance of
the protocol [14, 15]. While we have realized our se-
cret sharing protocol using photons and polarization en-
coding, alternative schemes, like proposed or realized in
BB84-type protocols can be adopted as well. One might
think of other forms of information encoding, higher mul-
tilevel, or continuous variables. Finally we stress that by
showing that our approach is equivalent to the use of a
many qubit GHZ state we opened the door to the pos-
sible application of this method in other generic multi
party communication tasks.
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